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5INTRODUCTION
In the Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010, prepared by 
the World Economic Forum, Bulgaria remains 76   out of the 
total 134 countries. That is the lowest position, occupied by an 
  
 
EU member state.
th
A quick review of the new EU member countries' advantages is 
useful for finding points for improvement of the Bulgarian com-
petitive positions. The new EU member states, losing positions 
in comparison with the previous edition of the Report, are the 
Baltic states. But the reason for their worse positioning is the 
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment as a result of 
the crisis. Nevertheless, the Baltic States keep their leading 
position due to well performing institutions and markets, and 
rapid improvement of technologies. From the group of newest 
EU member-states, most distantly from Bulgaria stands the 
Czech Republic taking 31   position. Significant improvement 
of the institutional environment, market efficiency and techno-
logical progress establish Czech leading position within the 
group of new EU member-states. Poland has moved most signi-
ficantly (ranking 7 positions up) among the new member-states 
to 46  position. The advantages of strong Polish education sys-
tem, the significant improvement of Polish public institutions' 
quality and the increased trust in transparency and efficiency 
of the officials are among the keys to the Poland higher ranking. 
Factors like EU membership and rising GDP growth rates during 
the last years stimulated and provided resources for pursuing 
these reforms. 
th
The infrastructure, innovations and institutional environment 
are areas where Bulgaria must make efforts to improve the 
competitiveness of the economy. Weaknesses that must not be 
ignored are the lack of workforce qualification, significant 
lagging behind innovations, insufficient scale of cooperation 
between science and business. They demand extra investments 
comparable with the level reflected by the investments in 
education and training index for those new EU member-states,  
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far ahead in the ranking. Concentrating the governmental 
policy in this direction would rapidly raise the competitiveness 
of the Bulgarian economy to another qualitative dimension. 
Issuing the current publication, the Economic Policy Institute
aims at providing a wider ground for a follow-up of the discu-
ssion within the conference on the competitiveness of the Bul-
garian economy, held on November 26, 2009. That was the se-
cond 2009 edition of the conference. We hope that the informa-
tion provided, the ideas shared and discussed will give an im-
pulse of new researches and further discussions. We will be 
pleased if the collected information could serve also a source 
 for the governmental decision-making process.
Ivanka Petkova
Chairman, Economic Policy Institute, Sofia 
WELCOMING ADDRESS 
Traycho Traykov
Minister of Economy, Energy and Tourism 
of the Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia
The competitiveness issues have always been important. And 
now when the "economic puzzle” is mixed up and it is going to 
be rearranged in accordance with the new priorities, the com-
petitiveness seems to be even more topical when it comes to 
comparing Bulgaria's position to other countries and raising the 
questions what could be done in this direction. 
With regards to the competitiveness, our task as representatives 
of the executive is on the one hand, to create conditions, to 
maintain and improve the environment and on the other hand -  
to create and apply tools that we have at our disposal when it 
is necessary.  
Concerning the economic environment - I think that sometimes 
we do not fully recognize how many things have already been 
done and what level of development we have already reached. 
Bulgaria is one of the three low-risk countries in Europe; the 
balanced budget we keep has to ensure a financial stability and 
to guarantee that there are practically no financial risks within 
the state. In the same time, despite the inevitable restrictions, 
Bulgaria has managed to preserve a favorable taxation with low 
and predictable taxes. The engagement for reducing the insu-
rance burden is being fulfilled; the administrative procedures 
are gradually improving as well. The possibility for setting up a 
company with a token nominal capital only within four days is 
other factor for attracting more and more foreign investors to 
start their business in Bulgaria. Each of the above mentioned 
measures have been already taken and we work in order to 
make them even better. The concrete instruments for that are 
also different and it is very helpful when they are presented 
and discussed which allows us to see what the feedback from 
their implementation is. 
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Operational Programme “Competitiveness” is one of the most 
powerful tools of the Ministry of economy, energy and tourism 
of Bulgaria. With its almost EUR 1.2 bln. the Programme could 
make difference and could support many firms' policies. For this
reason, the new team in the Ministry of economy, energy and 
tourism puts the Programme among the first priorities since it 
stepped into office. So far, we undertook all the possible and 
rational actions to make the management and the implementa-
tion of the Programme effective indeed. There will always be a 
debate on whether the state could actively support a given in-
dustry, sector or even a company, or whether the market should 
be given the freedom to expand to a certain level before the 
state intervenes. If the second scenario is to happen, certain 
pre-conditions are definitely needed and we work on reaching 
them. Firstly, a fundamental analysis of the specific needs has 
to be made  to provide the basis and the current state and only 
then to evaluate periodically the conditions and the develop-
ments, which will make it obvious where exactly do we are and 
what could we do for a better performance of the economy. I 
could assure you that within the field of responsibilities of the 
Ministry of the economy, energy and tourism the business will 
receive a maximum support; we will remain open to any con-
structive ideas and the best of them will be integrated in our 
policy.  Our team will try to define the optimal allocation of the 
resources which are limited by default. Finally, I wish success to 
the initiative!
WELCOMING ADDRESS 
Bogdan Mirchev
Representative of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Bulgaria, 
Sofia
Since the previous conference on the competitiveness of the 
Bulgarian Economy in March 2009 till today many challenges 
have been met and many important decisions have been made -  
a big number of changes occurred, including fundamental po-
litical changes. The main focus of the current conference is the 
consequences of the crises and the perspectives for future de-
velopment of the country's competitiveness. After the deep cri-
sis situation of growing budget deficit in the summer of 2009, 
in the autumn the first effects of the anti-crisis measures such 
as lowering the budget deficit and its movement towards a sur-
plus, a growth of the export, etc. are visible. Although, it is 
clear that the situation remains severe and many challenges are 
still ahead. The initiative for holding a series of conferences 
aims at exchanging views, strategies and positions among the 
government, business and NGO representatives on the policies 
that foster the competitiveness. As a result îf these confe-
rences, Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF) in cooperation with the 
Economic Policy Institute (EPI) issue a publication containing 
the lecturer's presentations given within the particular panels. 
Hanns Seidel Foundation is a German political foundation rela-
ted to the Bavaria's ruling conservative party Christian Social 
Union. The political foundation as a term is related to founda-
tions close to the main political parties in Germany and their 
activities are financed by the Federal Republic. The activities 
abroad are funded entirely by the federal budget. These activi-
ties are to be checked by the Bundesrechnungshof - the German 
Federal Audit Office. Although the foundations are closely asso-
ciated with a certain political party, they remain independent 
and autonomous non-governmental organizations which 
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are open to every citizen and they work mainly in the field of 
promoting the democratic values and processes. Since its esta-
blishment in 1967, the Hanns Seidel Foundation has already 
implemented more that 90 projects in more than 50 countries. 
Eastern Europe lies amongst the main priorities of the founda-
tion. It has offices in Sofia, Belgrade, Tirana, Bucharest, Zagreb, 
Prague and Kiev. The main activities of the Hanns Seidel Founda-
tion are related to expert cooperation for consolidation of the 
integration process in the new member states such as Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. Hanns Seidel Foundation 
has a representative office in Bulgaria since 1994. Until now our 
main activities aim at implementation of projects in the three 
major fields: politics, administration and economy. Economic 
Policy Institute is one of our main partners in the field of eco-
 nomy. CHAPTER ONE
NATIONAL POLICIES FOR FOSTERING 
OF 
COMPETITIVENESS
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Kalin Marinov
Executive Director, 
Economic Policy Institute, Sofia 
The arguments in favour and against the involvement of the 
government in the national economy have always been a matter
 of disagreement among the economists but the participation of 
the central authorities in overcoming of the economic downturns 
seems to be inevitable and even necessary. The other side of the 
coin is the government's set of mechanisms for enhancement of 
the competitiveness, especially during an economic crisis. Loo-
king through the possible anti-crisis measures and their impacts 
on the national competitiveness the following sub-question will 
arise: is it possible for a country to take advantage of the crisis 
and to gain competitiveness? The positive answer is obvious 
since the crisis affects each country through different channels 
and the adequacy and effectiveness of the government policy 
could not only result in limiting the impacts but also in impro-
ving the comparable mood. However, in the case of Bulgaria the 
answer is related to the given economic parameters  the exis-
tence of a currency board, decreasing value of the FDI, increa-
sing unemployment rate and contracting of the GDP growth rate.
In the first months of the crisis, when it was still hard to fore-
cast its impacts, the alerted governments implemented a set of 
policies based predominantly on the increase of the volume of 
the government expenditures and the focus was not on whether 
this is the right approach but on the allocation of the financial 
packages. Stimulating the national economy with funds from the 
national budget would have positive impacts in case of large 
economies as the central authorities have the financial resources 
to interact on several sectors and sub-sectors. The pouring of 
national funds into business organizations in small open econo-
mies proved to be unfounded endeavor since it faces constraints 
to be an effective anti-crisis measure. The available financial 
stimuli are usually limited and could not influence an essential 
part of the economic sectors. Such measures in small economies 
would have exclusively short-term impacts and could lead to 
imbalances in the business relations between the entities opera-
ting in different sectors.
The worsening trends of the economic indicators gradually 
brought under consideration another type of government policy 
which is not based on an increase in the expenditures but on 
institutional and regulatory reforms as well as on sharp striving 
for effective absorption of the financial resources. The small 
economies were first to face the contracting revenues to the 
national budgets which was also one of the reasons for the re-
versal of the nature of the government policies.
The implemented government policies in Bulgaria in the last 
year and a half are following the general characteristics of the 
decision-making process mentioned above - expanding the volu-
me of the government expenditures and initiating institutional 
and regulatory reforms. There is no doubt that the implementa-
tion of large infrastructural projects is favourable for the compe-
titiveness of the national economy as they could attract FDI, 
but the commencement of the work on an infrastructural pro-
ject by itself does not automatically lead to its completion. 
However, the lack of clear priorities in terms of the selected 
infrastructural projects for implementation and the inadequate 
financial planning of the national funding are becoming obsta-
cles for the completion of these projects and they are contribu-
ting to the accumulation of budget deficits.
Overcoming the budget deficit was one of the main priorities of 
the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance in 2009. On the one hand the 
achievement of this goal will send to potential foreign investors 
a positive signal and a proof of macroeconomic stability in the 
country. On the other hand the low deficit will give to the coun-
try a better point of departure in the negotiations over the acce-
ssion in the ERM II and in the Eurozone. Suppressing the budget 
deficit will be also one of the main priorities in 2010 as the tax 
revenues are expected to contract further as a result of the 
decrease in the internal consumption, import and export. The 
fiscal instruments are often used as mechanisms for fostering 
the economic growth and competitiveness but in the case of 
Bulgaria this option seems to be depleted. The corporate tax 
rate and the income tax rate are already lowered to the levels   
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of 10 % and the decreasing of the social insurance payments is 
the only rational mechanism to be used during the crisis period 
in order to keep larger share of the financial resources on the 
disposal of the economic entities. The Bulgarian government 
took the cautious commitment to decrease slowly the social 
insurance payments by 5 % starting with 2 % from the beginning 
of 2010, which allows the financial authorities to plan national 
budgets with clear further decline. Similar scheme of planned 
gradual decrease of the tax rate was widely used by the Euro-
pean countries in terms of the corporate tax (for example Baltic 
states). Although, Bulgaria would not become a member of the 
Eurozone at least till 2013, the country should have optimal 
fiscal framework before the accession to the monetary union as 
afterwards all the maneuvers with the instruments of the fiscal 
policy would have to be subordinated to its stability.
The alteration of the VAT conception is also one of the eventual 
scenarios for the future fiscal policy. The changes are possible 
both in terms of the tax rate (decreasing, increasing and diffe-
rentiation) and the tax basis. The VAT tax was firstly implemen-
ted in Bulgaria in 1994 at the rate of 18 %. The rate was increa-
sed to 22 % in 1996 and lowered to its current level of 20 % in 
1999. There is only one differentiated VAT rate in Bulgaria and 
it is on the level of 7 % for the hotel accommodation when it is 
part of organized trip. Bulgaria is one of the countries with the 
most limited differentiation of the VAT rate in the EU. There are 
three other countries which use one flat VAT rate (Denmark, 
Germany and Slovakia). In March, 2009 the member-states of 
the EU reached an agreement for the implementation of diffe-
rentiated VAT rates in several concrete services and goods areas  
personal and home care aides, restaurant entrepreneurship, 
small repair activities, hairdressers' services, book sale, construc-
tion and fur trade. However, the agreement is not mandatory 
and the countries are allowed to set their own fiscal policies.
A decrease in the VAT rate of 1 to 2 % would not lead to the same 
growth in the household incomes as the companies would absorb 
 
it and transform it into a net profit. At the same time any de-
crease in the VAT rate would have strongly negative impacts on 
the revenues of the national budget especially during the econo-
mic downturn and will have no direct impacts on raising the 
competitiveness of the economy. In 2010 it is envisaged that the 
revenue volume accumulated by VAT would be approximately 
BGN 6.8 bln. In the nutshell we could conclude that the decrease 
in the social insurance as direct taxation would be more reliable 
measure to ensure growth in the household incomes. Although, 
if there are positive trends in the national economy the govern-
ment still have the intention to decrease VAT to 18 % in its fiscal 
policy agenda for 2010.
In November 2009 was implemented an important positive amend-
ment in the legislative framework of the VAT, which is envisaged 
to ensure better liquidity of the business entities and improve-
ment of their investment planning. Thus, the VAT reimbursement 
from the government authorities is now reduced to 30 days 
instead of 45 as was till then. An additional guarantee for 
the implementation of this reform is the introduction of penalty 
interest rate.
One of the measures for the increasing of the competitiveness 
of the Bulgarian enterprises and fostering their export capacity 
was the additional capitalization of the Bulgarian Development 
Bank in the second quarter of 2009. Gradually, this financial 
instrument which was envisaged to raise the export orientation 
of the Bulgarian business was transformed into anti-crisis mea-
sure, which allowed companies with low or no export capacity 
to receive access to the provided credit lines. Furthermore, the 
financial package granted to the Bulgarian Development Bank 
was not at the needed volume to create a downward pressure 
on the interest rates on credits provided by the commercial 
banks and the interest rates on loans to non-financial companies 
with volume of up to EUR 1 mln. were between 10.5 and 13.5 % 
as of the end of 2009. The forecasts for 2010 are that the credit 
rates will decline slightly by up to 1.5 %. One of the indicators 
which hides a certain risk for the stability of the banking sector 
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in the country is the share of bad loans in the total volume of 
the credits. It is expected to reach its peak for the crisis period 
in the second half of 2010 at the level of approximately 10 %. 
The Bulgarian National Bank reduced sharply the levels of the 
base interest rates as part of its policy portfolio aimed at resto-
ring the credit activity of the commercial banks. In December 
2010 the base interest rate was fixed at 0.55 %.
The Operational Programme “Competitiveness of the Bulgarian 
Economy 2007-2013” and the Operational Programme “Regional 
Development 2007-2013” are the main government mechanisms 
to interact in the national economy and foster its competitive-
ness. However, they are still not implemented to their full po-
tential and the absorption rate is low as it could be concluded 
from the following reports in the current chapter.
The discussions over the anti-crisis measures in Bulgaria inevi-
tably lead to the debate in favour or against the maintaining of 
the currency board and the missed possibilities for the national 
economy to gain competitiveness on the basis of floating exchan-
ge rates. Although, the Bulgarian producers in several sectors 
experience the price pressure by the competitive enterprises, 
importing production from the neighboring countries, the cur-
rency board remains a necessary prerequisite for preserving the 
macroeconomic stability and suppressing any upward inflation 
trends that would prevent Bulgaria from entering the ERM II.
Ivan Kapitanov 
Senior Expert, Ministry of Finance of Bulgaria 
Herewith I will try to focus your attention on the main measures 
of governmental support towards the economic agents to mini-
mize the negatives from the current economic and financial cri-
sis on them. As you know more than a year has already passed 
since firms and households started suffering from the crisis. It also 
impacted negatively on the public finances. The decreasing trend 
affected both the revenues and the total budget execution. 
Most of our efforts were put into preserving the national econo-
mic stability without allowing the expenditures to prevail over   
the revenues, which is a feasible goal so far. In the same time, 
the Ministry of Finance does not underestimate the necessity of 
actions towards stimulating business activities. Currently, one 
of these steps is to relieve the insurance burden which will po-
sitively influence the companies. 
A further helpful tool is the set of measures of the Bulgarian 
Development Bank. We will try to provide it with resources for 
encouraging the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or eventu-
ally to fund them through commercial banks in 2010.  
Another measure which is being discussed is to reduce the volume 
of debts on behalf of first-level spending units to their contrac-
tors. Since these amounts are sufficient, we expect their paying 
off to revive the markets and to reduce indebtedness between 
the economic operators. The Ministry of finance already works 
in this direction and we hope it will be done soon, which will 
positively influence the current status of all the economic units.
Furthermore, the Ministry is concentrated on the informal eco-
nomy. The unregulated imports caused considerable losses which 
hindered the development of local producers. For that reason, 
the Ministry will do its best to restrict the size of the informal 
economy and unfair competition, thus contributing to increasing 
the incomes of local entrepreneurs and consequently the budget 
revenues as well. 
Since the government still experiences difficulties caused by 
the continuous crisis, main tools for supporting SMEs will be the 
Operational Programmes' funds. Therefore, a higher attention 
will be paid to the effective adsorption of funds. We expect an 
increase of absorbed funds from all beneficiaries  including mu-
nicipalities, SMEs, non-governmental organizations, in view of 
the fact that the administration performs well in managing the 
Programmes. This will undoubtedly improve beneficiaries' mar-
ket positions. Despite the uncertain situation and the lack of 
explicit positive outlooks, we do expect to observe a recovery 
of the Bulgarian economy by the middle of 2010 and even to 
witness an overfulfilment of some budget revenues.
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Beside the measures mentioned above, the Ministry of Finance 
works on a number of others, but at the moment all the efforts 
are directed towards achieving a balanced budget and mainta-
ining economic stability which currently is the main focus of the 
Ministry.  
Julieta Hubenova
Adviser on European Programmes in the Ministry of Economy, 
Energy and Tourism of the Republic of Bulgaria
In terms of competitiveness, Bulgaria ranks amongst the worst 
performing countries in EU before as well as after its accession 
to the Union. The experience of small and medium enterprises 
in Bulgaria does confirm it. Most of them were indeed not ready 
for the challenges of the single market. This logically leads 
to the idea of a better development of our national economy 
with the support of the EU Operational Programmes funded 
mostly by the EU budget (85 %) and co-financed by the national 
budgets (15 %).  
Unfortunately, 2008 was marked by the spreading global finan-
cial and economic crisis. Bulgaria was supposed to be an isola-
ted island but naturally this proved to be a wrong perception. 
The firms' feedback pointed in the first quarter of 2009 a de-
crease in their turnover up to 25-30 %. Why is that? If they are 
export companies the demand for their goods is decreasing. If 
they work on the domestic market, in most cases their contrac-
tors rely on export, so the above-mentioned decline indirectly 
impacted on them. Thus, by the end of the year the total 
decrease reached up to 50 %. 
Less affected appeared to be the enterprises in the food pro-
cessing industry. Some of them even registered an increase in 
their turnovers. Only in the beginning of 2009 an insignificant 
decrease occurred due to media campaigns over a supposed 
bad quality of the traditional white cheese and the frankfurters. 
Another reason for the aforementioned decrease is the difficult 
access to financial resources. Trade banks suspend the over-
 
draft payments to firms which were approved to get such and
they respectively cannot pay for the big quantities of row ma-
terials they import. Because of this, the production is decrea-
sing and consequently  their turnovers as well. 
Below, I will give you more information about the main goals 
the Operational Programme “Competitiveness” supports: mainly, 
to develop a dynamic competitive economy on a European level 
and more specifically to encourage innovations and to improve 
the enterprises' efficiency. As you know, the main indicators of 
positive development of a given enterprise in terms of the crisis 
are the innovations and the value added. Another main factor is 
the business climate improvement. 
The Programme consists of five priority axes which seek to ful-
fill of the abovementioned main and specific goals. The first 
axis aims at development of a knowledge-based economy and 
innovative activities. 21 % of the total Programme budget is 
allocated to this priority axis. The second axis refers to enter-
prises' efficiency and promoting of supportive business environ-
ment. The greatest share of the total Programme (51 %) is 
allocated to this axis. Financial resources for enterprises' deve-
lopment are set under the third priority. This is the JEREMIE 
initiative. The fourth priority has to strengthen the internatio-
nal market positions of the Bulgarian economy. 
Enterprises are the main beneficiaries within the first two prio-
rity axes managed by the Bulgarian Small and Medium Enter-
prises Promotion Agency as an intermediate body. The annual 
procedures, the annual calls for projects within the Programme 
and their approval are duties of a Monitoring Committee. 
Projects under five procedures only are received in the period 
2007-2009 whereas 13 procedures are to be implemented du-
ring 2010. According to the European Commission, the develop-
ment so far is not appropriate at all but the main goal of the 
whole team working on the Programme is that all granted funds 
will be absorbed effectively by the Bulgarian economy. 
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246 500 000 40 16 146 726 36 15 590 590
30 4 629 996 27 4 219 784
10 11 516 729 9 11 370 806
593 837 780 698 130 717 214 581 113 912 748
The status of the five priority axes is available at Table 1. below.
It shows how much of the funds are absorbed, how many 
contracts are signed and how many of them are active. The 
total amount of EUR 192 mln. includes signed and effective con-
tracts with small and medium enterprises as well as contracts 
with institutional beneficiaries of the Ministry of  economy, 
energy and tourism. A contract, due to be signed with the 
European Investment Fund, will pave the way for management 
of the JEREMIE holding fund. The main goal of JEREMIE is to 
provide financial resources to the SME through intermediate 
units. 
Table 1. OP “Competitiveness”  status as of 30.10.2009. 
Priority
Priority
Total 
budget
(EUR)
Total 
budget
(EUR)
Number 
of 
contracts 
signed
Number 
of 
contracts 
signed
Total amount 
of the signed 
contract's 
grants
(EUR)
Total amount 
of the signed 
contract's 
grants
(EUR)
Number 
of 
contracts 
in 
execution
Number 
of 
contracts 
in 
execution
Total 
amount of 
the grant
(EUR)
Total 
amount of 
the grant
(EUR)
Development of 
knowledge and 
innovation-based 
economy
Support for startups 
or existing 
enterprises with 
innovative potential
Support for 
implementation of 
innovative products, 
processes and 
provision of 
innovative services
Increasing efficiency 
of enterprises and 
promoting supportive 
business environment
296 73 877 012 225 58 603 453
42 49 667 174 41 49 185 958
360 7 173 028 315 6 123 337
200 000 000 1 200 000 000
87 011 870 6 37 778 258 6 37 778 258
1 10 945 892 1 10 945 892
1
11
14 007 644 1 14 007 644
6 502 845 6 502 845
Improvement of 
technologies in small 
and medium enterprises
Improvement of 
technologies in large
 companies
Introduction of 
internationally 
recognized standards
Financial Resources 
for Developing 
Enterprises*
Strengthening the 
international market 
positions of
 Bulgarian economy
Promoting the 
investors' advantages 
of Bulgaria
Promoting the 
internationalisation 
of the Bulgarian 
enterprises
Improvement of quality
infrastructure and of 
the services offered by 
the Bulgarian Institute 
of Meteorology  a factor 
for increasing 
the competitiveness 
of Bulgarian enterprises
22 23
1
11
1 1
2 939 370 1 2 939 370
1 109 601 1 109 601
2 272 906 2 272 906
34 865 901 7 24 861 024 7 24 861 024
1 162 215 551 751 409 503 222 630     192 142 620    
Consolidation of 
supervisory and control 
bodies within the state 
Agency for 
Meteorological and 
technical supervision 
as an element of the 
national quality 
infrastructure
Priority Total 
budget
(EUR)
Number 
of 
contracts 
signed
Total amount 
of the signed 
contract's 
grants
(EUR)
Number 
of 
contracts 
in 
execution
Total 
amount of 
the grant
(EUR)
Access improvement 
for accreditation 
services
Elaboration of the 
standardisation 
system in Bulgaria 
Technical assistance:
Total: 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism of the Republic of Bulgaria
The latest data show a decrease of the real GDP growth by 4.2 % 
during the first half of 2009. The value added in the industrial 
sector went down by 11 %, the agricultural one by 6 % for the 
same period. The consumer prices declined too and deflation 
reached 0.2 %, the unemployment rate reached 7.88 % in August 
2009. The households' consumption was also reduced by 8.2 % in 
the period April-June 2009. In July 2009 the industrial produc-
tion contracted by 18.9 %, the turnover  by 24.5 %. Within the 
period January - July 2009 a decline in the international trade 
was also observed since the export decreased by 30.6 % and the 
import  by 35.1 %. The foreign direct investments within the 
same period reached EUR 1.88 bln. (5.6% of GDP) in comparison 
to EUR 3.95 bln. (11.6 % of GDP) for the period January - July 
2008. 
What are the anti-crisis effect and role of the Programme? The
main priorities set are an efficient response to the challenges, 
overcoming of the consequences of the global crisis and appli-
cation of measures for raising the public trust. The latter con-
cerns the small and medium enterprises since they cannot see 
how the Operational Programme works for them and how it 
supports their activity. As a result, the trust in the Programme 
on behalf of the business dropped considerably. 
What are the direct and the indirect effects of the Programme?
Many of the measures to be implemented are related to promo-
ting supportive business environment for the SMEs, pro-active 
export policy, improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
business. Such measures aim at giving the business an opportu-
nity for investing in new machinery, equipment and technolo-
gies because Bulgaria ranks among the last in terms of econo-
mic productivity. The Programme provides also support for 
transition to a knowledge-based economy, promotion of inno-
vations created by SMEs and encouraging the cooperation 
between them and the academic circles. The Programme also sti-
mulates “intelligent” investments, e.g. investments in techno-
logies such as import of patents and know-how. 
The fourth priority axis, managed by the Bulgarian Small and 
Medium Enterprises Promotion Agency, foresees pro-active ex-
port measures as promotion and support to SMEs for participa-
tion in exhibitions, fairs and trade missions as well as providing 
them with more detailed information about external markets. 
SMEs need to know what their position on the international scene 
is. Therefore, it is encouraged the organization of different 
information campaigns for the business as well as issuing of a  
catalog with the Bulgarian firms whose products and services 
could be attractive to foreign business. The axis also aims at 
optimization of the tasks and the activities of the economic and 
trade services provided by the Bulgarian embassies abroad as 
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well as promotion of export credits and multiplying the activi-
ties for export insurance. For the sake of sustaining the innova-
tion activities and for promotion of “intelligent” investments, 
innovative start-up enterprises, commercialization of innova-
tions and improvement of R&D personnel's potential are suppor-
ted. All these measures referring to the pro-innovative structu-
re of the economy are to be triggered in 2010 and are meant to 
create new and to further develop already existing pro-innova-
tive infrastructure, to modernize the R&D equipment and to 
establish a national innovation network. In order to create new 
jobs, to save energy and to foster investments in green techno-
logies which will contribute to the low carbon sectors, we will 
support investments in key future skills and in rising energy 
efficiency.  
Which are the specific initiatives for counteracting the global 
economic crisis? We do increase budgets of future grants (e.g. 
40 mln. instead of 20 mln.) by ensuring the possibility for ad-
vance and intermediate payments. When the Programme was 
launched such payments under the given procedure did not 
exist. On the other hand, beneficiaries encounter difficulties 
in obtaining a bank guarantee indeed. For this reason we initia-
ted meetings with the Bulgarian Development Bank to negotia-
te what kind of a guarantee tool could be created as the Bank 
holds most of the capital of the Guarantee fund and it could 
help SMEs to receive the advance payments. Meetings with the 
 
  
on all legal acts are already in their final phase, the invest-
ment strategy of the Holding Fund is already determined and 
we expect the Fund itself to be established by the end of 2009. 
From 2010 on it will be possible funds to be directed to SMEs 
through financial institutions. A review of the processes for ac-
celerating the execution of the Programme will also  be done. 
We have formed a few working groups to determine what the 
obstacles were for the Programme to work better and for the 
funds to be adsorbed more effectively by SMEs. Measures are 
undertaken for at least half of the proposals not to be rejected 
for administrative reasons yet in the first phase and to conti-
nue in the approval process with easier and quicker procedures. 
All these problems are already being solved. The manuals are 
already improved. We are doing our best for the funds to reach 
the SMEs. 
 
Association of the Bulgarian banks are also in progress. We also 
increase the intensity of our assistance. For example, if it is up 
to 50 % for small and medium enterprises, there is an option for 
the assistance to be raised up to 70 %. The intensity of the as-
sistance within the next calls has been already increased. Most 
of the efforts are focused on the execution of the JEREMIE ini-
tiative. The negotiations with the European Investment Fund 
These are the forthcoming procedures already approved on
 November 25, 2009 at a meeting of the Monitoring Committee.
The total amount of the funds to be provided to the small and
medium enterprises is about EUR 500 mln.  
Anitsa Ruseva
Chief Expert, Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works
of the Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia
Operational Programme “Regional Development” (OPRD) which 
is executed by the Ministry of Regional Development and Public 
Works is an infrastructure programme, which contributes main-
ly to improvement of Bulgarian municipal and regional compe-
titiveness. OPRD is funded by the European Fund for Regional 
Development. The total amount of its budget is EUR 1.6 bln. or 
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more than BGN 3 bln., including a national co-financing amoun-
ting to EUR 240 mln. On November 5, 2007 the European 
Commission approved the “Regional Development” Operational Pro-
gramme. The main strategy of the Operational Programme con-
sists of few goals: to make living and working conditions in the 
regions and municipalities of Bulgaria more attractive by redu-
cing the socio-economic differences both within the country 
and between Bulgaria and the other EU member states; to im-
prove regions' access to different networks (communication, in-
formation and energy supply ones). By mentioning this it should 
be taken into account also the urban and industrial environ-
ment; the access to main services; the social, cultural and ecolo-
gical environment. 
The specific goals of the Programme are to build sustainable 
and dynamic urban centres and to connect them with the less 
urbanized surrounding areas; to provide better transport, infor-
mation, communication and energy supply connections within 
the regions. Another objective of the programme is to improve 
the tourism potential, which could add value to the sector, to 
encourage regional cooperation and to merge local and regio-
nal cooperation capacities on national and European level. 
OPRD pursuits its main strategy goals through four priority axes, 
the first of them is a sustainable and integrated urban develop-
ment. This axis is due to receive the greatest share of the total 
funding and emphasizes on the attractiveness and competitive-
ness of metro areas; their development; providing of better li-
ving conditions and access to public services by preserving the 
ecological potential of the regions at the same time. 
The second priority axis is Regional and local accessibility. It is 
meant to rise and improve the connectivity between the regions 
in the larger metro areas and includes 86 municipalities on the 
territory of Bulgaria, which are defined within the Operational 
Programme's analysis. The first and the second priority axes 
spotlight on the urban agglomerations since they are considered 
to be centres of development and growth for their surrounding 
 
areas. The Regional and local accessibility aims at improving 
roads and transport connections, building energy connection 
infrastructure as well as upgrading information and communica-
tion technology networks and gas supply infrastructure. 
The third priority axis is sustainable tourism development. It is 
also a national priority and seeks to improve the regional tou-
rism potential. The specific products from a given region have 
to be developed by adding value for the region which will in-
fluence positively the sector and the national sustainable 
development.  
For the fourth priority axis of key importance is the local deve-
lopment and cooperation. Beneficiaries of funds within this axis 
are the municipalities, located out of the urban agglomeration 
areas and more precisely - those needing small scales of invest-
ments for a significant improvement of their competitiveness. 
Recently, the evaluation of projects on landsides as small-scale 
investments in small municipalities was completed within the 
current axis. Another direction of the axis is the interregional 
cooperation among EU regions (including Bulgarian) to focus on 
sharing experience in the field of OPRD. Beneficiaries are the 
municipalities, regional areas, district administrations, any 
kind of European regions and non-government organizations as
well. 
The last, fifth priority axis supports Technical assistance. It 
exists in all the Operational Programmes. Its share of the ove-
rall funding is 3.8 %, which amounts to a EUR 54 mln. It focu-
ses mainly on improving the managing body's and beneficiaries' 
capacities for a better implementation of the Programme. Ma-
naging body for Bulgaria and a beneficiary in the same time is 
the Directorate General “Regional Development Programming”. 
The first grant scheme was opened on 1 November 2009. The 
approval decision of the Programme was taken by the EC a few 
days later. The official opening of the Programme in Bulgaria 
was accompanied by events in Sofia and other second level
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cities where the Directorate General is presented by territorial 
divisions. Parallel conferences announcing the start of the Pro-
gramme were also held. 
The amount available for the 21 opened calls is approximately 
1/3 of the total Programme. According to the latest informa-
tion as of 30 September 2009 a few projects are already in a 
process of evaluation. 539 project proposals are approved. Since 
many of the projects are in their final phase of execution, the 
current trend shows an increase of the transferred amounts. 
The contracts between beneficiaries and managing bodies in-
clude the option for subsequent execution and assignment of 
construction works and service supply by Bulgarian firms. In 
terms of crisis such a measure could contribute to the adsorp-
tion of funds anyway stipulated for Bulgaria. The funds stipula-
ted in Bulgaria in accordance to the Operational Programms 
exceed the pre-accession funding several times. But these funds 
need to be adsorbed for the membership into the EU to have 
indeed a positive effect on the Bulgarian municipalities, regions 
and the whole economy.  
European funding is also a tool for supporting the Bulgarian en-
trepreneurs executing public procurements. It encourages the 
economic activity and creates new jobs. The infrastructure ac-
tivities within OPRD on municipal level could improve competi-
tive living and tourist conditions, and could encourage econo-
mic activity in the regions also. For that reason, all the stake-
holders need to strictly observe the rules and requirements es-
tablished, to implement projects with the smallest possible 
delays, if any. Seeking optimization of the processes based on 
analyses, the EU requirements are improving and reflect the regu-
lations of Structural Funds. Despite such a general optimization, 
the managing body in Bulgaria works on internal optimization
of the control and management systems, including the Structu-
ral Funds Manual. 
An increase is observed in the trend of transferred amounts from 
the managing body for the period November 2008 - November 
2009. This is mostly valid in the last months. The overall in-
crease was almost double in September 2009 compared to July 
2009. Moreover, some final payments on projects under OPRD 
have been already made. 
OPRD through its priority axis supports the social environment 
within the prerogatives and the territory of different municipa-
lities, which include kindergartens, cråches and schools. The 
main beneficiaries of the Programme are municipalities as they 
are considered to be the main actors for regional development 
that could contribute to enhancing of local potential. 
Monika Hristova
Senior Expert, Credit Lines Department in the Bulgarian 
Development Bank, Sofia 
The mission of the Bulgarian Development Bank (BDB) is to fa-
cilitate the implementation of government's economic policy in 
the field of export by SMEs and the access to funding. The tools 
for achieving that, as reflected in the Law for the Bulgarian De-
velopment Bank, consist in loans, guarantees and risk assets. 
The risk assets, scheduled to be involved in a risk capital fund 
subsidiary of BDB, were not in the focus in 2009.
The activities of BDB could be divided into two groups. The first 
group includes short-term pre-export lending and long-term in-
vestment lending. The main purpose of BDB is not to compete 
with the commercial banks but to complement their activities. 
In our activities portfolio prevail the investment functions. 
Another feature of BDB is the way of fundraising. It is focused 
in attracting external financial resources from different inter-
national financial institutions, mostly Europe-based (e.g. cor-
responding development banks), instead of using accumulated 
deposits. Another point is the fact that BDB is the only state-
owned bank - the Ministry of Finance holds 99,9 % of its assets.  
'
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Since 2000 our international partners are the European Invest-
ment Bank, the Council of Europe Development Bank, the Euro-
pean Investment Fund, etc. 
Despite BDB's specific characteristics and functions, it is obliga-
ted to act in accordance with the regulations valid for any other 
commercial bank. It complies with the state aid provisions and 
enjoys a strong support on behalf of the major shareholder. BDB 
increased its funds by more than 10 times during the last year. 
Our performance has been successful - we gained a profit of BGN 
9 mln. in the fist three quarters of 2009. The evaluation of our 
capital adequacy ratio is also very positive. To be mentioned is 
the shift from direct financing to on-lending - BDB provides finan-
cing to commercial banks which offer lending to SMEs. Such an 
on-lending is due to another feature of BDB - its headquarters 
are in Sofia and one more branch is based in Plovdiv while 
commercial banks have good country coverage which makes their 
services more accessible to SMEs. 
In 2009 BDB has also a certain anti-crisis function. A share of 
assets, originally meant for capitalization of BDB was relocated 
to commercial banks in order to make the access of SMEs to 
funding easier. Within the last year we stipulated external re-
sources for the SMEs amounting to EUR 103 mln. which is 150 % 
more than the resources in the ten-year history of the bank. 
In times of crisis it is understandable that commercial banks en-
counter obstacles in providing loans to SMEs. Due to a risk in-
crease and a more expensive price of free resources, the options 
for funding SMEs are even more limited than they used to be be-
fore the crisis. As a result, small and medium-size business be-
comes much more vulnerable. Secondly, the limited funding 
leads to investment cuttings and reducing of activities. Most 
affected appear to be the construction and metallurgy sectors, 
tourism, trade and services sectors. In many European countries 
including Bulgaria the access to loans is crucial for the econo-
mies to recover. 
Clients of BDB are small and medium enterprises. According to 
statistical data, they amount to 282 615 and hold BGN 3 bln. 
fixed assets along with the corresponding incomes for 2007. 
They employ approximately 1.6 mln people. Products of BDB 
designed for SMEs are long-term loans (up to 10 years); loans 
under relieved security requirements; short-term export and 
pre-export loans and loans co-financed by the structural funds.  
 
80 % of the Bulgarian Development Bank portfolio consists of 
investment credits, 96 % are one-year credits and 55 % are for 
a period exceeding 5 years. In terms of sectors, the manufac-
turing one prevails. However, the bank seeks a risk diversifica-
tion by sectors. If the portfolio is considered according the 
planning regions, the leader is the Sofia region which reflects 
the concentration of economic activities and the territorial al-
location of SMEs in Bulgaria.  
Beside the direct funding, BDB provides also à targeted finan-
cing to commercial banks - the so called anti-crisis measures 
which started in 2008 and continued in 2009 as well. There are 
two programmes which are sought to facilitate the access to 
funding. The first target is SMEs and the second one - the far-
mers. An amount of BGN 375 mln. is stipulated within the first 
programme for providing long and medium-term loans. Because 
of liquidity difficulties short-term loans were added to the same 
programme. BDB has 14 partners within the two programmes. 
The beneficiaries number to 1216 for both programmes and the 
jobs created and preserved are respectively 1828 and 5926. 
The total amount of the assigned funds is BGN 460 mln. 
While the partner commercial banks provide loan rates to their 
beneficiaries up to 7 or 8%, BDB interest rate is limited to 5 %. 
Another limitations concerns the maximum costs for taxes, 
commissions and administration fees which must not exceed 
0.7 % of the total loan amount. 
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Depending on the given commercial bank's policy the loan colla-
teral for a SME could be an estate, equipment or facilities.For 
the sake of lowering the risk in terms of crisis the commercial 
banks increase the required guarantees. However, according to 
statistics, SMEs do not obtain considerable amount of fixed 
assets. Of course the difference in their location, the depre-
ciation and their technical specifications should be taken under 
consideration. 
It should be also taken into account that the most of the newly 
established entrepreneurs do not own enough fixed assets to 
guarantee a loan, which raises a need of guarantee schemes. 
BDB has signed an agreement with the European Investment 
Fund (EIF) in 2003 amounting to EUR 42 mln. Currently the bank 
has another guarantee line of EUR 60 mln. which allows further 
loans to be raised up to this amount.
What does a relieved collateral requirement mean? For examp-
le, if a given loan requires collateral of 100 %, BDB is able to 
decrease the percentage to 80 %, on the basis of the guarantee 
line provided by the EIF. This represents a decrease by 20 %. 
The requirements to the beneficiaries are as follows: the bene-
ficiary should be a SME; the loan could be long-term or at least 
18-months; the loan could be up to EUR 500 thsd. and the total 
amount of the exposure to a given entrepreneur must not ex-
ceed EUR 1 mln. Usually such loans are funded under the BDB 
programme. Basically, BDB and EIF share the risk and if a given 
loan is bad, the two institutions will also share the loss in the 
proportion based on the credit portfolio of loan guarantees. 
After the overall recovery of the bad loan, BDB restores the 
share assigned to EIF.  
The National Guarantee Fund (NGF) was established a year ago 
and is 100 % owned by BDB. It is competent to issue guarantees 
of collateral supplements for SME loans, granted by commercial 
banks. Ten contracts with commercial banks amounting to BGN 
76 mln. have already been signed. The number of collaterals 
issued as of 30.10.09. equals to BGN 3 mln. but there is still a 
 
 
room for improvement. The possibilities for a NGF development 
are significant. If we assume a leverage of 3-4% over the BDB 
capital, which is BGN 80 mln., the issued collaterals could reach 
up to BGN 320 mln. Naturally, the usage of these funds and the 
above mentioned funding scheme depend entirely on the given 
bank's policy and its risk estimations. The highest amount of the 
guarantee for investment loans is BGN 500 thsd. and for turno-
ver loans - BGN 250 thsd., taking also into consideration that the 
expenditures on collateral issuing could not reach more than 
1 %. We work on improvement of the collaterals as well as on 
increasing the number and the amounts of the contracts. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BULGARIA AND THE EUROPEAN 
FRAMEWORK OF COMPETITIVENESS
Prof. Andràs Inotai
Director General, Institute for World Economics, Budapest; 
President, Economic Policy Institute, Sofia
Firstly, let me mention that in some parts of Europe, the com-
petitiveness in the last period has got not only a positive but 
also a negative evaluation. It is the same when we talk about 
reforms. We are talking about reforms and when we want to 
introduce some of them, we experience a lot of opposition from 
different social groups. And then there is a certain reform fati-
gue. And that is to some extent what we see also in the Euro-
pean Union - a competitiveness fatigue in the last period. So, 
competitiveness by a large number of people is more and more 
considered to be a pressure of constant adjustment. And if there 
is a constant pressure for adjustment to a new situation, it 
always hides lots of risks; it is connected with personal and so-
cial costs. And this has been emphasised instead of keeping on 
stressing on the chances the crisis is offering and not only the 
risks and the additional costs. 
The global map is characterized by the emergence of new coun-
tries. We have much more competitors both on a country level 
and even more on a company level and we have a number of 
new factors of competitiveness. If we look at the number of 
different competitiveness rankings we have - from the Institute 
for Management and Development in Lausanne and the World 
Economic Forum, etc. If one takes a look at all these surveys it 
becomes obvious that they have become more and more com-
prehensive in the last ten years than they have been before. At 
the beginning they have included just some economic factors. 
Then later they started to include good governance, institutions 
and in the last years - even social behaviour. If you look at one of 
the latest comprehensive reports both produced by the Bertels-
mann Foundation - one on the Transformation Index and the 
Sustainable Governance Index you can see that there are more 
than 100 factors and there is a very clear shift from the status 
oriented economic factors towards longer term factors like in-
vestment in education, health, the appreciation of the human 
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factor and how the societies are working - to what extent the 
societies are able, capable and willing to adopt and to support 
some reform measures. And that is extremely important if you 
look at the crisis and particularly at the potential post-crisis 
situation. 
Which countries will become winners of the post crisis 
situation? To a high extend it is not dependent only on the eco-
nomic policy of the countries. It is dependent to a growing ex-
tent on how the societies are able to perceive the chances and 
not to oppose all the adjustments saying we have some vested 
interest we would like to protect what we have achieved and 
the less we can protect, the more we try to protect it - that's 
very human. And that is my first point.  
The second point is that some of the traditional competitiveness 
factors do not work anymore. One of them was of course cost-
price or the price competitiveness. That is a very old theory that 
if you have low labour costs then you will attract a lot of foreign 
direct investments. If the low labour costs had been the main 
attracting factor of international investments, today 95% of in-
ternational investment would be in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is 
not the case. Of course, low competitive labour costs are im-
portant but there are a number of other factors. For instance, 
in technology-driven economies, the labour costs have a fraction 
of 2 to 3 % of the total costs. Much more important are the inno-
vative capacity, physical infrastructure, good governance, etc. 
The second old element that used to be factor of competitive- 
ness is the exchange rate policy. That was a wide-spread expe-
rience in the 1970's, 80's, even in the 90's. Main idea was that if 
a country started devaluating its currency (that is the East Asia 
model with competitive devaluations at that time), then you 
can get additional competitiveness; you will be able to explore 
new markets; to increase market shares, etc. What we see today 
is that particularly in globally opened economies, which are 
operating with a number of transnational companies; if your 
exchange rate is depreciating it does not bring much more mar-
ket share because generally your exports have very high import 
content. So, if you devalue then immediately the import value 
is increasing and the only theoretically positive impact you can 
 
 
perceive of devaluation is the value added. If you have a very 
low value added (8-10 %) of the total exports then the negative
impacts may outweigh the potential positive ones. We have also 
seen that there are three Central European countries - Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary that have depreciated their 
national currencies by about 20 % in the last year. And none of 
them was able to compensate at least partially the collapse of 
the international trade. One explanation is that the collapse was 
so dramatic that even a 20 % potential benefit in the exchange 
rate did not help or it did help in some countries but not in direct 
exports. It “helped”, for instance to all the three countries 
but via the latest EU member-state - Slovakia in a way that Slo-
vak citizens are not buying in Slovakia at all - all of them are 
shopping in Poland, in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. That 
has of course repercussions in the domestic economy. And then 
the role of the exchange rate has been revitalized because these 
countries are members of the EU and they are striving to become 
members of the Euro zone. For that they have to take into 
account the Maastricht Criteria and convergence towards these 
criteria, which keeps the exchange rate policy very much con -
strained even if the exchange rate is free floating. 
Another traditional element used to be what I would call regu-
latory competitiveness. It was used by the latest EU members 
before their accession and they have made a broad use of this 
instrument. They were attracting foreign companies with very 
low taxes, holiday taxes with a lot of additional support. And 
this is not anymore possible because of the competition rules 
of the EU. So, you have to be very careful what kind of attrac-
tion is allowed by Brussels and what is not allowed. 
Next point is very important. Recently Mr. Trichet - the presi-
dent of the European Central Bank emphasized on the connec-
tion between the external and internal dimensions of competi-
tiveness. It means that infrastructure, transportation costs, 
technological development and last but not least - intensive 
competition on the domestic market is a pre-condition of ex-
ternal competitiveness. The more the country is closed, the 
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more the domestic market is maintained for domestic produ-
cers and the less competitive these firms would be on the in-
ternational market. 
The next point is specialization. There has been a change and 
there is a constant change among the individual countries. There 
are three different specialization patterns. One is what we call 
factor-driven, that depends on labour costs, primary education, 
macroeconomic stability, institutions, and infrastructure. The 
second is efficiency-driven that is goods and labour market 
efficiency, financial markets sophistications, technological readi-
ness, higher education and training. And the third one is innova-
tion-driven. Now we can see in which stage the individual 
countries are and which countries are in transitional stage 
between factor-driven, efficiency-driven and innovation-driven 
competitiveness. One case is not very well known - China is 
between factor-driven and efficiency-driven competitiveness. It 
is far not only factor-driven as many people say  the Chinese
 commodities are produced at a very low labour costs and they 
have only that competitive advantage. But if you look at the 
Chinese export to the EU more than 50 % of the Chinese exports 
contain medium and high-tech products. Whether the high 
technologies come from Chinese or from European or American or 
Japanese multinational companies working in China is another 
issue. But it is by far not cheap, low-quality, labour intensive 
goods. And these 50 % of the Chinese export is by about 40 % 
more than the total EU exports to China.
One more point here is the static versus the dynamic element 
of competitiveness. It is quite clear that in future the dynamic 
elements will be appreciated, upgraded. It means not only re-
lying on prices and costs and maintaining the old structure that 
at a certain time used to be competitive on different markets. 
It's the capacity of the companies and governments, to learn to 
react rapidly to the challenges and to innovate. The capacity of 
permanent modernization of technology and of management has 
become and will become the key element of international com-
petitiveness even more in the post-crisis situation. 
And the last point here what is expected to change is the go-
vernments - not only the good governments, but also efficient 
governments as well. It is not by chance that the OECD has pub-
lished a book recently - “Government at a glance, 2009” em-
phasizing the importance of efficient government policies in 
preparing the member countries of the OECD to the post-crisis 
challenges of international competition. 
 
The impact may be positive and negative. It is definitely positi-
ve if the anti-crisis measures have been focused on restructu-
ring of the companies, or the banking sector that has been sup-
ported, and if these anti-crisis measures contributed or have 
been contributing to the creation of future-oriented competiti-
ve jobs. Unfortunately, most of them were taken by those Euro-
pean countries that were in a position to take such measures on 
a large scale, they have supported structural rigidities. Most of 
the bailing out - be it banks, be it the car industry have not 
been connected with restructuring. We will bail out the banking 
system; we will bail out the car industry, we will keep 10 000 
of jobs (mostly uncompetitive jobs) for the future. But that is 
certainly not the way. In the European Union several countries 
will be facing a lot of problems including the budgetary con-
strains because of the huge indebtedness in the next period. 
Another point is how is the competitiveness related to the cri-
sis? I have two more remarks here. One is that as the negative 
growth was accompanied for the 1   time after the WW2 by the 
dramatic collapse of international trade in a short term seems 
that countries with large domestic market did suffer less than 
those which are absolutely open. However, in the post crisis si-
tuation it is quite clear that small open economies with a high 
level of flexibility will be again the winners. So, don't be deceived, 
don't be diluted in your judgement by the importance of the large 
domestic market. The large domestic markets are not closed 
markets either. In the EU everybody in the internal market can 
go to the large domestic market of Germany, France and the 
other countries. The second remark which is much more important 
is how the anti-crisis measures may have influence on the future 
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competitiveness of the European countries.
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The last point is concerning the vulnerability - competitiveness 
and vulnerability especially in the small new member countries 
and what can we do in this case in order to increase our com-
petitiveness. Firstly, the financial vulnerability - that was the 
case in Hungary particularly, the EU was suffering very much 
from the financial vulnerability. Here the tasks are quite clear - 
solid fiscal policy, higher savings, a lower interest rate, a lower 
margin between the domestic interest rate and the Euro interest 
rate. These are mainly domestic tasks. Concerning the trade 
vulnerability  all countries have been suffering from the trade 
vulnerability. The answer is not closing down like some populist 
politicians used to propose because the country is too much 
open and it should close down. But how could you do so if you 
are a member of the EU? The answer is not to close down. The 
answer is: try to diversify your export structure to dynamic mar-
kets. As it in fact happened - most of these dynamic markets are 
outside the EU. But if you are on the company level - the com-
panies have niche strategies. There are very dynamic niches also 
in the European market even if the total EU market is not 
growing at all. 
The other vulnerability is the sector vulnerability - specialization 
vulnerability. What kind of industry did you specialize on? Was it 
the car industry, computers or electronics; was it food industry, 
textiles, labour intensive goods? In fact, those countries that 
have specialized on higher tech industries - machinery, cars, 
electronics, and telecommunication equipment, they seem to 
suffer more at the moment. Because we have to buy bread every 
day, we don't have to buy a car every year; we don't have to buy 
a new computer every half a year. But, again - the answer is not 
to specialize on other sectors such as shoe industry. Would you 
like to compete with Vietnam? You can do it, if you have Viet-
namese wages, but will have to tell the society that in the next 
twenty years they will have Vietnamese wages. So, are you sa-
tisfied with it or not? Then the answer is - deepen the sectoral 
specialization and increase the value added to your domestic 
production. 
There is a structural vulnerability as well. It is expressed in the 
duality of the production structure - you have a very competitive 
transnational sector, and you have the enterprises generally 
small and medium size and they are generally lagging behind, 
not competitive, etc. In the EU where there are a number of 
programmes to help the small and medium size enterprises - 
in small countries like Hungary, but I would say also in Bulgaria 
also, there should exist two very important criteria for those 
SMEs, allowed to get EU funding. First is that they have to prove 
that they are also competitive outside the domestic market  
it can be that you are a sub-contractor to multi-national com-
pany in your country but even more  are able to export at 
least to the neighbouring countries. Such an export capacity 
has to be developed. And the second criteria for receiving fun-
ding are that if you have a brilliant idea, you should also indi-
cate the spill over or the multiplier effects of your project. It 
is not enough to have a good idea. You have to specify - it will 
create additional labour or jobs, it will contribute to regional 
development, it will improve the physical environment, it will 
have some innovative ideas also for the other sectors, etc., etc. 
And the last which is probably the most important issue in the 
future - the social or the mental vulnerability. All our countries
are vulnerable in this sense. The question is  how much social 
cohesion, how much insurance, how much crisis awareness and
crisis management capacity is available in the country. Not 
only on company level. Not only on the level of public adminis-
tration, on the level of societies. To what extent the societies 
are open, adjustable, flexible, and future-oriented, instead of 
going back to the past. And here I could make two final remarks 
for our region; unfortunately I don't know how we could change 
them. All the Central and South Eastern European societies after 
20 years of transformation are characterized by prematurity, 
if you want - early born consumerism instead of saving. Without 
much higher savings, and it is not financial but behavioural ques-
tion, to what extent the society is able and ready to invest 
into the future rather than to consume all that has not been 
produced. Unfortunately, last 20 years because of this catching-
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Kristofor Pavlov
Chief Economist, UniCredit Bulbank, Sofia
Bulgaria is the EU member state with the lowest production 
costs. Another competitive advantage remains the favourable 
tax environment for the corporate sector and even more favou-
rable after introducing the 10 % flat taxation of individual inco-
mes. For an exception could be given the social insurance pay-
ments that are among the highest in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE). Even though, the tax environment could be defined as 
one of the most favourable in CEE. Bulgaria is considered by the 
foreign investors a gateway to the Western Balkans markets and 
the Black Sea region. The key location of Bulgaria and its close-
ness to the Western Europe countries gives the country additio-
nal competitive advantages. This is even more important in the 
context of unequal competition with India and China, for examp-
le, which are offering much lower labour costs than Bulgaria 
does. Unlike them, the country has the potential to produce
limited series of products with lower transport costs and deliver 
them relatively faster. Besides, the proximity to Western Europe 
is an encouraging factor for Western companies to enter the Bul-
garian market, because the closeness appears to be important 
for the branches' effective management. According to World 
Bank estimations, Bulgaria obtains one of the most flexible la-
bour markets compared to all new EU member countries with 
emerging economies.
In regards to the international trade specialization, Bulgaria 
obtains competitive advantages in the traditional labour-inten-
sive goods and products from sectors such as food and drink 
producing, clothing and textiles, furniture sector. Moreover, 
the country keeps good market positions in producing interme-
diate products like metals and chemicals. Bulgarian industry 
and economy are also high energy-intensive. The low-technology 
manufacturing industries with insignificant value added are 
predominant. The relative share of high- to semi-technology 
products in the total exports is approximately 20 %. In compa-
rison with the CEE countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland the same indicator values at 40 to 55 %. 
If we use Michael Porter's theory on economic development sta-
ges, it could be concluded that the Bulgarian economy is in the 
transition stage between the factor-driven stage and the effec-
tiveness-driven economy. 
The first stage is specific for states depending entirely on access 
to production factors (mostly cheap labour force and natural 
resources). The companies within this first stage of develop-
ment are competing entirely on a price basis of offered goods 
and services and the economy specializes in producing low com-
plexity goods, mostly extraction of row materials and producing 
intermediate goods. The low productivity characterizing this 
stage also determines the low wages. 
In the second, efficiency-driven stage, the countries focus gra-
dually on implementing more effective production processes 
and on improving the quality of goods and services. The econo-
my gradually makes a transition to producing goods of higher 
complexity. Consequently, one can observe an increase in pro-
  
up process and the demonstration effect coming from Western 
Europe were characterized by this early born consumerism. It 
is very difficult to change that. And the last is how to create 
social capital, solidarity, small community cohesion, families 
and future-oriented networks, long-term education and health 
issues, etc. investing into the human capital. Tallentum is a 
London-based research institute. It has produced a list based 
on the performance of 104 countries according to the innovative
capacity, macroeconomic stability, education, health, etc. 
Hungary holds the 27   place. The Czech Republic is 25  , Slo-
venia  20  . But in all the indicators except one Hungary is fluc-
tuating between 21 and 30 which is good in average. There is 
not much discrepancy from the 27. But there is one indicator 
that the country occupies place 92 out of 104. And that indica-
tor was social capital. 
th
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ducing semi- to high-technology goods such as durable and in-
vestment goods. Main characteristic of the companies in this 
development stage is their willingness to invest not only in phy-
sical capital but also in high quality workforce. Therefore, the 
competitiveness of the countries in this stage of development 
progressively depends on the higher quality of education and 
qualification of the workforce, the effective functioning of mar-
kets and the flexibility of the labour market, and on companies' 
access to new technologies as well as their readiness to take 
advantage of them. At this stage, the existence of well deve-
loped financial markets is extremely important for guaranteeing 
that the savings will be located to the best entrepreneurs' pro-
jects proposed for funding.  
What are the main challenges towards the transformation of the 
Bulgarian economy from the factor-driven to effectiveness-driven? 
If we take a look at the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), 
Bulgaria lags behind the rest new EU member-states in three 
main pillars. Namely - the Institutions, Infrastructure and Finan-
cial market sophistication. 
The quality of economic institutions is important because they 
determine the stimulus of the economic operators which is the 
main tool for influencing economic operators. Moreover, the 
institutional environment influences the investments in human 
capital and new technologies and thus also the organization of 
production processes. The institutional environment reflects 
not only the total economic growth potential of each country 
but also the effective allocation of resources within the economy. 
It also has a leading role in the process of distributing public 
benefits and bearing the costs needed for economic moder-
nization. Therefore, the institutional importance is far not limi-
ted only to drawing the legal framework or in other words  
defining only the “rules of the game”. The governmental attitude 
towards the freedom of market and its effective functioning is 
crucial. According to GCI, Bulgaria is far beyond the levels 
reached by the CEE countries and those considered acceptable in 
the field of fight against organized crime; legislation effective-
ness; independence of judicial system; prevention of misuses of 
public funds; bringing back the public trust in politicians; equal 
rules for all companies and entrepreneurs in regards to the de-
cision-making process; restrain the wasteful spending of public 
funds; protection of property rights; and the barriers put in 
front of the business from the number of regulations. 
The quality of education and healthcare are also fundamental 
for the competitiveness and productivity improvement. That is 
extremely valid for the Bulgarian competitiveness aiming at 
modernization and reduction of labour-intensive and low tech-
nology sectors with low value added in favour of sectors 
offering highly paid jobs and producing high technology products. 
Unfortunately, GCI indicates Bulgarian education is inadequate 
for what the business demands. CGI also estimates the flows of 
brain draining; the qualification of personnel; the quality of 
management schools' tuition and the extent to which the com-
panies are adsorbing new technologies as disappointing, which 
underlines the need of urgent and deep reforms in these areas. 
The balance between increasing labour costs on the one hand 
and improvement of business environment on the other will 
shape the evolution of competitiveness sources and at the end - 
how successful Bulgaria would be in its efforts to restructure 
the economy. This definitely means that the country needs to 
speed up the reforms towards improvement of institutions, in-
cluding healthcare and education similarly to the CEE countries. 
In perspective, the evolution of the Bulgarian competitiveness 
has no other alternative, because the current low labour costs 
are source of competitiveness only in short term. Such a source 
simply cannot exist along with China and India. Moreover, the 
low labour costs oppose the national ambitions of reaching the 
incomes and standard of living in EU. 
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Simeon Semov 
Director Legal Directorate, Bulgarian Stock Exchange, Sofia
What is the linkage between competitiveness and the stock ex-
change? The Bulgarian Stock Exchange (BSE) is the place where 
admitted shares and securities are being dealt with. The 
connection to competitiveness consists in the fact that the stock 
exchange gives the chance to good ideas for given business de-
velopment to congregate with free individual or institutional 
funds. They are to be invested through the stock exchange in 
those companies estimated by the analysts to be the best per-
forming. Thus, the most competitive companies will receive 
the best financial support. There is a direct relation between 
the stock exchange and the national economy - one big stock 
exchange could not exist in a small economy. So, the stock ex-
change is a reflection of the national economy. 
BSE has strengthened its role in the field of financial interme-
diation. Many experts say that funding through the stock is a 
bank loan alternative. The truth is that the stock exchange 
meets operators with a lack of resources with those who need 
funding. For an economic operator to receive funding through 
the stock exchange is necessary to meet certain requirements - 
to own a joint stock company, to keep a number of specific 
functions; to be listed in the public register of the Financial 
Supervision Commission; to obtain a public status and only then 
the economic operator could deal with its shares on the stock 
exchange.  
Public funding through the stock market has become a good al-
ternative of bank loans from 2004 till recently. The investments 
in stock market financial instruments have increased significantly. 
Unfortunately, an indicative fact is that there is not a single 
initial public offering during 2009. The process of privatization 
is another option for the stock exchange to be successfully in-
volved. A privatization through the stock exchange is among the 
most transparent ways to privatize a company. If such decision 
is taken, the government can get the highest price for the deal 
 
 
and it will be done transparently, in accordance with the speci-
fic requisites for the process. On the other hand, the investor 
who acquires ownership of the public company will not be en-
gaged in preserving jobs, fulfilling plans, etc. which are requi-
red according to the other ways of privatization. 
Main principles in stock exchange trading are the equality of 
all players and irrevocability of the transactions. Bulgaria was 
obligated to harmonize its legislation to the European directi-
ves and that was made very quickly but unfortunately in the 
easiest way - by copy-pasting the directives in our legal acts, 
instead of trying to cope with them but in accordance with our 
national specifications. Main European directive, treating in-
vesting through stock exchange trading is the Markets in Finan-
cial Instruments Directive (MiFID). The main benefit of that 
document is related to the so-called MiFID passport, which gives 
a firm once authorised, the right to use the MiFID passport 
to provide services to customers in all other EU member states.
What are the injuries caused by the financial crisis to BSE? The 
foreign investors stepped back in the end of 2008. While in 2007, 
43 % of the foreign assets were invested through the Bulgarian 
Stock Exchange; in 2008 they decreased to 15 %. Some of the 
planned IPOs were postponed and part of them did not take 
place at all. The listed banking institutions limited also their 
activeness. Institutional investors like large funds and predo-
minantly pension funds are extremely cautious. Unfortunately,
we experience an extremely low liquidity and turnover and as 
a result almost all small investors (individuals) withdrew from 
the stock exchange. 
BSE reached its peak in October, 2007 followed by a big crash. 
The trade intensity fell down to its levels from the end of 2004 
and the beginning of 2005. 
What is next? After considerable drop in the indexes, we observe 
a hesitant stabilization as well as a hesitant increase, though, 
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it is still too early to be concluded that these are signs of an 
overall improvement. The interest in the stock market as an 
alternative source of funding for the business gradually comes 
back. Anyway, it should be clear that everyone seeking funding 
through the capital market should be at a certain economic 
development stage for being able to pay the price for issuing 
shares. It needs to be mentioned also that the price for being 
issuer on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange is among the lowest 
world-wide. The government has also declared willingness to 
trade shares of the state monopolies using the platform of BSE
Among our main priorities is to provide an active support to 
public companies. The BSE team is ready to consult them on 
any issue in case to back their activity.  We organize events like 
round table discussions for promoting and provoking the enter-
prises to be listed at the stock exchange and to issue stocks. 
The BSE has become popular both among people and business 
circles. The first step towards integration within the developed 
EU markets have been made by promoting the worldwide elec-
tronic securities trading system Xetra “Exchange Electronic Tra-
ding” based in Frankfurt, Germany. It is also used in Austria, 
Ireland. Xetra is used as a base in China, Shanghai. 
It could be concluded that the CEE countries' potential remains 
high. Bulgaria could again obtain the position of attractive pla-
ce for investments, including those attracted at the stock ex-
change. Furthermore, the country has positive perspective for 
turning into a regional financial center. 
Micho Chipev
Exhibition Director, German-Bulgarian Chamber of Industry
and Commerce, Sofia
Among the tools for real-time definition of competitiveness and 
for market positioning of the Bulgarian products on the interna-
tional markets is the participation in fairs and exhibitions. One 
of the priorities of the German-Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce 
 
 
(GBCC) is to provide support to the German, Bulgarian and firms 
from third countries, interested in the German-Bulgarian bilate-
ral relations. 
How is this priority realized? We help the German firms coming 
to Bulgaria to participate in exhibitions. The chamber also re-
presents a few German fairs in Bulgaria. More precisely - our 
organization represents six of them and the rest are represen-
ted by German companies, which have Bulgarian offices. There 
are less than 1 000 companies from Bulgaria manufacturing pro-
ducts which could be presented at international fairs. These are 
the Bulgarian export companies. In Germany they reach 400. 
One of the main mistakes made by Bulgarian companies while 
participating in a fair is the lack of goals to pursue. The main 
indicator of competitiveness for a given company remains its 
ability to buy and sell. For this purpose it must either produce
goods (services) or hold free capitals. When the company is able 
to trade, then it becomes an object of interest on behalf of the 
other economic operators. The main idea of fairs consists in 
meeting those companies offering their production with the 
ones willing to buy it. 
Along with the export, the import is also determinative for the 
overall competitiveness. If a company holds free capitals, this 
is a sign that it is well performing. On the other hand, the fairs 
and exhibitions give total information about the products: did 
they gain market positions and what exactly are those positions. 
The distribution is also a crucial link in the whole process of 
selling a product. Unfortunately, in the general case the Bulga-
rian companies can only use their local distribution networks. 
This definitely prevents them from succeeding on the European 
markets. In this regards, the fairs and exhibitions give good per-
spectives for establishing and strengthening positions abroad. 
How could the government choose fairs in certain country and 
how could the government encourage Bulgarian firms to parti-
cipate? The only (or at least the most imperative) criterion is 
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the volume of the export. That reflects the last years' trends. 
The same concerns the import, respectively the gross product. 
Another important point is the definition of interests. A weak 
point of the Bulgarian economy is the definition of sectoral 
interests and interests of group of companies. You are probably 
familiar with the fact that it is difficult for industrial and trade 
chambers to examine the interests of their members, let alone 
to reach unification. The definition of group interests itself is 
very important but hard to be achieved in the case of Bulgarian 
strong individualism. Efforts in this direction could have a posi-
tive affect on country's competitiveness. 
The governmental policy should not focus on increasing the 
companies' competitiveness. That is definitely not governmen-
tal mission but responsibility of the companies. The only thing 
government should do is to create conditions for the companies 
to exist, to produce and respectively - to contribute to the 
budget revenues. It is totally wrong policy if the cabinet chooses 
which the priority branches will be. From strategic point of 
view this leads to distortion of competition and wrong market 
positioning, experience shows. The government obtains tools 
for stimulating certain sectors. For example it could set public 
targets and the companies to compete for the adsorption of 
the earmarked funds for public purposes. That would indeed 
improve the competitiveness. 
The business indicator prepared by the National Statistic Institu-
te in Bulgaria measures the expectations for development of the 
Bulgarian business from 1997 onwards. Another available data 
is those extracted from the Bulgarian-German turnovers which 
could be considered representative (covers approx. 8-10 %) for 
the total Bulgarian turnover. The correlation between both 
indicators definitely exists - the business expectations are involved 
in direct subordination with the traded volumes between the 
countries. Any change in the attitude leads to a fluctuation in 
volumes. 
Having available the import and export in and out of Germany 
along with the number of Nuremberg fair visitors in Germany, 
a comparison between them could easily be made. The main 
conclusion is that the top 10 visitor countries are those having 
highest trade volumes with Germany. This makes it clear that 
even the highest willingness is unable to make a difference in 
a chart order. There are certain actual parameters and given 
economic limitations which makes it impossible to switch posi-
tions without firstly improve them. This is completely valid for 
Bulgaria. Countries from the EU are among the top 10 trading 
partners of Bulgaria. A diversification it the trade contacts with 
the second and the third tenth partner countries could be posi-
tive. 
The governmental policy allowed another weakness in 2009  
e.g. the funds through the Bulgarian Small and Medium Enter-
prises Promotion Agency were exhausted yet in March 2009 and 
there are not even estimations for such funds in 2010. While 
any given country participation in such a fair demands prepa-
ration exceeding a year or year and a half. Therefore the 
government and all the interested parties need to reconsider 
the possibilities for Bulgarian companies' to participate more 
actively in fairs and exhibitions, which would reflect on their 
overall competitiveness. 
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CHAPTER THREE
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE BUSINESS CLIMATE IN BULGARIA
Tsvetan Simeonov
President, Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
Sofia
General Indicators for Business Climate Assessment 
(Positive Impacts)
   Banking system - stable; 
   Monetary system - no currency risk (fixed exchange rate), 
low inflation; 
   Political environment - functioning democracy;
   Effectiveness of the judicial bodies - signs of improvement; 
   Labour market - increased unemployment rate 
(opportunity for expert selection). 
..
...
General Indicators for Business Climate Assessment 
   Banking system - high interest rates; 
   Monetary system - currency board in Bulgaria and currency 
devaluation in neighbour countries (Romania, Turkey, etc.), 
cost raise of Bulgarian goods and services compared to the 
other countries in the region;
   Political environment - division and disagreement between 
the ruling party and the opposition on all matters (lack of 
national consensus on strategic issues); 
   Effectiveness of the judicial bodies - slow reforms, disuse of 
arbitration and mediation;
   Labour market - lack of sufficiently qualified labour force 
(despite growing unemployment/ wage increases for those 
who remain employed). 
.
.
.
.
.
.....
Specific indicators
Tax burden;
Administration and Regulations;
Access to financing;
Public procurement transparency;
Shadow economy rate. 
(Negative Impacts)
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Perspectives for the Business Climate
   Good perspective compared to other countries, if tax stakes 
remain unchanged - they will stimulate investors;  
   Fight against corruption preconditions sends positive signals 
to foreign investors;
   Stable budget with no deficit also has  a  long-term  positive 
impact on investment intentions as it does not suggest further 
internal increases to treasury liabilities. 
.
.
.
.
.
.
Necessary Actions
   Attention must be paid to further administrative functions 
optimisation by: 
   - Computerisation of all activities (breaking the chain client-
clerk) 
   This will allow administration reduction and cuts in the 
budget expenses. 
   Focused and prudent advertising campaign of Bulgaria and 
its business; advertise the good framework for business and 
Bulgaria's attractiveness - messages must be conveyed to the 
companies and persons with investment interests. 
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Dr. Evgeni Evgeniev
Private Sector Development specialist, World Bank1
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The World Bank regularly prepares analytical studies and provi-
des policy recommendations to the Bulgarian government that 
are also discussed in public. In the dawn of the global financial 
crisis one of these reports was the Bulgaria Investment Climate 
Assessment published in three volumes in autumn 2008 . It in-
cludes an extensive study of numerous factors that affect the 
investment climate in Bulgaria. To a large extent this report is 
still up-to-date (in particular the analysis and the recommenda-
tions for business climate improvements). In the regulatory re-
form field, the World Bank prepared four reports on Bulgaria 
since 2006 and two more are to be released by April 2010 . The 
specific goal of this expose is to direct attention to the regula-
tory reform which turns out to be the key for better business 
climate. Answers to three important questions shall be pursued, 
namely: (i) why is it crucial nowadays to put regulatory reform 
on top of Bulgaria's priorities?; (ii) what is the current state of 
the regulatory environment in Bulgaria compared to other coun-
tries in the region?; and (iii) how to achieve more favourable 
business climate in Bulgaria through the regulatory reform  prio- 
rity areas for the near future?
  The reports are prepared within the framework of the Technical Assistance 
in the Regulatory Reform area between the World Bank and the Bulgarian go-
vernment since end 2006. Main partners of the World Bank for this work are 
the Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism and the Directorate within the 
Council of Ministers Administration which manages, coordinates and controls 
the implementation of the Better Regulation Programme (2008-2010). The 
two World Bank reports that shall be completed by April 2010 are: (i) Report 
on the Administrative Barriers to Investment in Bulgaria; and (ii) Report for 
Post-Regulatory Impact Assessment of the Law on Limiting Administrative Re-
gulation and Administrative Control on Economic Activities Act.
  Responsibility for all errors, omissions, and opinions rests solely with the 
author.  This paper has not undergone the review accorded to official World 
Bank publications. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed 
herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of The World 
Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee 
the accuracy of the data included in this work.
  World Bank (2008). Bulgaria: Investment Climate Assessment. Washington DC.
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 members. Of course, one should bear in mind that the countries 
behind Bulgaria might be well developed or stem from a more 
developed regulatory environment where the need for reform 
change is not so pressing.
Figure 1: Regulatory environment standing of EU members
120
100
80
60
20
0
5 6 7 16 18
22 24 25 26 27 28 30 31 40
42 44 47 48 53 55
62 64 72 74 78
109
U
K
D
en
m
ar
k
Ir
el
an
d
Fi
nl
an
d
Sw
ed
en
Be
lg
iu
m
Es
to
ni
a
G
er
m
an
y
Li
th
ua
ni
a
La
tv
ia
Au
st
ri
a
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
Fr
an
ce
Cy
pr
us
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
H
un
ga
ry
Po
rt
ug
al
Sl
ov
en
ia
Ro
m
an
ia
Sp
ai
n
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Po
la
nd
Cz
ec
h.
..
It
al
y
G
re
ec
e
Source: Doing Business 2010 report (World Bank).
Actually, the report renders an account that Bulgaria concluded 
two reforms  in the fields of starting businesses and registering 
property. In comparison, successful reformers in the field of re-
gulatory reform are considered those countries that manage to 
conduct seven reforms per year, on average . 4
4   The whole Doing Business Index comprises ten indicators.
Despite the undertaken reforms, Bulgaria still has some catching-
up to do. The most recent Doing Business 2010 report marks the 
results up to June 2009, respectively, the Doing Business 2009 
report reflects the results until June 2008. Therefore, the last 
report does not mention the reforms undertaken by the new 
government in respect to “Starting a Business”, namely reducing 
the minimal paid-in capital for trade companies to BGN 2 and 
cutting registration period for firms to 4 days. The other indica-
tor is “Closing business activities”. In this area, Bulgaria clearly 
needs a change and this will be touched upon again at the end 
of the paper. 
Why there is a need to put regulatory reform on top of the 
Bulgarian policy agenda?
In the first place, poorly designed and administered regulations 
impose major constraints to growth and productivity and create 
strong incentives for small businesses to remain in the informal 
economy. In this light, Bulgaria does not want to drive firms 
(small firms, primarily) into the informal sector, especially 
nowadays. 
Secondly, the regulatory reform strategy must take a systemic 
approach. Regulatory and administrative barriers and policy 
inconsistency, as well as instability and unpredictability, are 
among the most significant impediments to both foreign and 
domestic investors. Hence, on the one hand, the current 
government needs to continue the successful reforms and good 
practices that have been put forward by the previous govern -
ment in the area of regulatory reform, and on the other hand, 
the present cabinet needs to prepare the ground for the inflow 
of foreign and domestic investment after the global financial 
crisis is over.
Thirdly, effective regulatory reform processes and institutiona-
lization of the system for monitoring and control of the regula-
tory environment would improve the investment climate by re -
ducing policy risks and cutting regulatory costs for the businesses. 
Thus, not only the business benefits from better regulation,
but it is also the government that profits by cutting red tape 
and improving administrative efficiency.
What is the current regulatory environment standing of 
Bulgaria compared to other countries in the region?
Concrete regulatory quality indicators demonstrate the position 
of Bulgaria among other EU members. Figure 1 shows Bulgaria's 
ranking according to the Doing Business 2010 report of the World 
Bank. The ranking (which does not include Malta) suggests that 
Bulgaria obtains the “golden mean” compared to the other EU
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Figure 3: % of companies identifying unfair competition 
practices from informal business as major impediment (2009)
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
It is well known that the informal sector is both difficult to de-
fine and difficult to measure.  As seen from Fig. 3, firms from 
Slovenia and Estonia do not see informal competition as a major 
constraint, whereas on average, the other countries' firm replies 
demonstrate that every fourth firm finds competition from the 
informal sector a major constraint. Many firms in Bulgaria iden-
tified in 2007 (as per World Bank Enterprise Survey) that the in-
formal sector is impeding their business activities and this indi-
cator took the third position (after corruption and policy insta-
bility) in terms of being firm's major constraint. In 2009, how-
ever, informal competition climbed to second place, after the in-
dicator “access to finance”. Little more than one out of five 
small firms and one out of four large firms in Bulgaria found com-
petition with the informal sector as the first major impediment 
for their business activities.  
Comparative data with the EU-10 in the field of corruption, in-
formal economy and regulatory quality, are shown below. These 
are taken from periodical World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
Figure 2: % of Bulgarian senior management time spent in 
dealing with requirements of government regulations in 
2005 and 2009
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Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
The high and often unpredictable burden of regulations is a 
major area of concern. In 2009, the World Bank Enterprise Sur-
vey registered in Bulgaria a serious increase of the time the 
average senior manager spends dealing with requirements 
imposed by government regulations (10.6 percent of their time 
(see Figure 2)), which, is comparatively similar to other 
new-EU member states from the region. However, this is a se-
rious increase compared to 2005. This indicator demonstrates 
a regulatory burden which affects the regulatory quality. 
It is widely considered that heavy and unpredictable regulations 
foster unfair competition and corruption. Indicators on that 
follow below.  
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manages in the  Enterprise Survey said that corruption is a 
serious problem for  their firm,  two years later the percentage 
remains very  high - each one out of three firms reports that 
corruption is a major obstacle. 
Figure 5: Public authorities' interpretation of laws and 
regulations in Bulgaria remains unpredictable and 
inconsistent
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2005, 2007); Survey on
Administrative and Regulatory Costs, conducted by AFIS Agency, 
ordered by Directorate at the Council of Ministers Administra-
tion, using a methodology provided by the World Bank (2009). 
Note: 2005 data are provided for all other new EU member 
states.
Public authorities' interpretations of laws and regulations in 
Bulgaria are unpredictable and inconsistent.  75 percent of 
businesses in Bulgaria either strongly disagreed or tended to 
disagree with the statement that laws and regulations are inter-
preted consistently and predictably.  This is higher than in the 
other EU entrants and higher than in 2005. In a recent survey, 
conducted by AFIS Agency on Administrative and Regulatory 
Costs in Bulgaria, the indicator came down to 55 percent, 
coming back to the 2005 levels, which is still very high.
Figure 4: % of companies identifying corruption as the first 
major impediment (2009)
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
  As per Anwar Shah (2007). Performance Accountability and Combating Cor-
ruption. World Bank: Washington DC, the four types of corruption are: (i) Bu-
reaucratic corruption. Isolated transactions by individual public officials who 
abuse their office by demanding bribes and kickbacks; (ii) Grand corruption. 
The theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by state officials-
usually members of, or people associated   with, the political or administrative 
eliteconstitutes grand corruption; (iii) Regulatory capture. The collusion by 
private actors with public officials or politicians for their mutual, private be-
nefit; and (iv) Patronage, paternalism and clientelism. This is when officials 
use their official position to provide assistance to clients or colleagues with 
the same geographic, ethnic, or cultural origin so that they receive preferen-
tial treatment in their dealings with the public sector.
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Most certainly, public sector corruption is a symtom of failed
governance. Corruption is not manifested in one  single form
and it typically takes at least four broad forms (bureaucratic
corruption; grand corruption; regulatory capture; and patro-
nage, paternalism and clientelism) .  The World Bank Enterprise
Survey at hand deals with bureaucratic corruption. Fig. 4 shows
that Romania scores exceptionally high when firms are asked
whether they identify corruption as a  major constraint, whereas 
Estonia and Slovenia score exceptionally low. The other countries 
are more or less in one group. In Bulgaria, the level of corruption 
remains after all very high. While in 2007, over 45 percent of firm
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The business is additionally overloaded by the state fees regime, 
which is unsystematic, unfair and non-transparent.  State fees 
made up BGN 850 mln. for the state budget in 2008 .The increase 
of state fees between January 2005 and November 2008 has 
been substantial  60 percent (without the calculation of the Mi-
nistry of Health Tariff, the increase of which has been the 
greatest) . A recent World Bank report noted that there is no policy 
regarding the setting of state fees in place  one reason for the 
“wild” development of tariffs that include state fees .There is 
still no such policy.  The report further indicated that the legal 
framework is outdated  the law is from the 50s of the previous 
century. There is weak institutional framework to monitor the 
setting and approval of state fees by executive agencies and 
ministries; wrong incentives are in place - there is a focus on 
the revenue generating function of fees and fines than on the 
legal requirements, namely the principle of cost recovery pro-
claimed by the European Commission when it comes to admini-
stration fees. Am example could be given with the tour operator 
fee that remains ungrounded  BGN 5000 (BGN 1000 for applica-
tion processing and BGN 4000 for registration). Additionally, the 
regulatory regime for independent restaurants/cafes still exists 
although it is almost inapplicable worldwide. Neither the pro-
cess to set fees nor to distribute retained fee revenues is trans-
parent  agencies are free to determine on their own and without 
clear criteria what budget to be put aside for additional bonuses 
for staff from those 25 percent, and sometimes even 75 percent 
of state fees revenues remaining in the agencies.
   Ministry of Finance Report of the consolidated state budget as of 31 Decem-
ber 2008.
  (2009). Analysis of State Fees, Administered at the Central Level and 
Proposals for Undertaking of Measures, Draft report of Working Group under 
the Ministry of State Administration and Administrative Reform. 
   World Bank (2009). Bulgaria: Reforming the Regime of State Fees. Document 
of the World Bank. June 2009. Available at www.worldbank.bg.
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The Better Regulation Programme (2008-2010) was adopted by 
the Bulgarian government in April 2008 in compliance with the 
“Better Regulation Agenda” of the European Commission. Im-
plementation of the Action Plan began soon afterwards. By now,
How to achieve better business environment through 
regulatory reform  priority areas for the near future?
The business in Bulgaria continues to be overloaded by non-
compliance with the provisions of the law, regarding applica-
tion of regulatory regimes.  The Limiting Administrative Regu-
lation and Control on Economic Activities (LARACEA) Act was 
adopted in 2003.  The Act was intended to reform the regulato-
ry environment by providing incentives for the business in simp-
lifying administrative regimes and administrative control. 
However, the implementation of the Law does not function well, 
despite its 16 amendments - there are still too much irregular 
regulatory regimes, primarily introduced by municipalities in 
order to collect fees, issuing superfluous regulations that bur-
den the business in terms of cost and time . 6
6 (2009). Analysis of State Fees, Administered at the Central Level and Pro-
posals for Undertaking of Measures, Draft report of Working Group under the 
Ministry of State Administration and Administrative Reform; World Bank (2008). 
Bulgaria: Investment Climate Assessment. Washington DC.
The non-compliance with the LARACEA Act is burdensome par-
ticularly for small and medium-sized enterprises in Bulgaria.
Exit procedures for firms are relatively time consuming.
Speedy closure of businesses is especially important in times of 
crisis. The estimated time required to resolve a bankruptcy in 
Bulgaria is 3.3 years (on average) as per latest data from the 
Doing Business 2010 report. This is about eight times as long as 
in the most recent best practice EU country (Ireland, 0.4 years).  
The cost of the proceedings in Bulgaria was about 9 percent of 
the estate in 2008, which is about twice the level of the best prac-
tice country in the EU (Finland, 4 percent). But, as bankruptcy 
proceedings take long time to complete, the assets depreciate 
considerably during the process (successful out-of-court mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution, known in the international practice,
 could be considered an alternative).    
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direct contacts with potential business partners. Trading missions' 
personnel selection issues and the follow-up assessment of their 
work become crucial, especially when their closing is needed. 
The competitiveness topic particularly in times of crisis is directly 
related to the effectiveness of the missions abroad. However, 
in order to make trade representations effective, they should be 
funded appropriately which will ensure the resources needed for 
participation in fairs and exhibitions.
In countries where rare languages are spoken it is often the 
case that deals do fail due to translation problems caused by Bul-
garian firms that prefer to economize from professional transla-
tion services. In cases like this, Bulgarian companies could turn 
to country's trade missions abroad for even translation support 
in the negotiation process. 
The Hungarian companies are traditionally interested in Bulga-
ria. That is obvious from the large bilateral trade turnover. Al
though the question remains  to what extent the Bulgarian com-
panies are able to meet the demands of that market? Often they 
are not pricing or technologically competitive, they lack for a 
certain production quality or partnership capacity. Usually such 
cases occur when multinational companies look for subcontrac-
tors, having high criteria and requirements. Then they usually 
turn to other partners in other countries. 
Competitiveness depends not only on the imports but on the ex-
ports also. Certain misbalance exists within the Bulgarian-Hun-
garian commodity turnover. The overall Hungarian export sur-
passes the Bulgarian several times. Such a misbalance could be 
explained with the commodities comprising the exports of each 
country. While the Hungarian export flows are formed mainly 
from high technology and value added goods, the Bulgarian is 
mainly from low-priced goods, whence the misbalance occurs. 
In terms of the volume of commodity turnover, Hungary ranks 
among the second tenth of countries trading with Bulgaria, 
which makes it a perspective future partner. Despite the nega-
.  
the Better Regulation Programme implementation has achieved 
progress: the Better Regulation Unit was created in the Council 
of Ministers Administration; the Government removed or simplified 
25 regulatory regimes, as per broad public consultations; 
www.strategy.bg became a portal for the initiative. Furthermore, 
181 illegal Municipality regimes were abolished; 14 Regulatory 
Impact Assessments (RIAs) were conducted for important 
legislation; over 250 bureaucrats were trained in applying RIAs; 
and a target of 20 percent by 2012 for reducing administrative 
burden for the business was adopted by the government . How-
åver, the Better Regulation Programme needs to be supple-mented 
and extended until 2013. Moreover, the RIA is currently not 
a mandatory tool, accompanying important legislation. And the 
new bill of the Normative Acts Law, which in fact introduces RIA 
as a mandatory tool, is still not in the pipeline of new legisla-
tion. Last but not least, satellite units for better regulation in 
all ministers are still lacking. Such units exist only in the Ministry 
of Economy, Energy and Tourism, as well as in the Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture.
10
10   “Better Regulation Program” Report for the period April 2008-April 2009, 
prepared by the Strategy Planning and Governance Directorate of the Coun-
cil of Ministers Administration, available at www.strategy.bg.
Òî conclude, the improvement of the business environment 
requires consistent government measures in the regulatory 
reform area. Those countries, which continue to demonstrate 
engagement in this realm, would be the countries that would 
benefit the most from the inflow of investment after the glo-
bal financial crisis is over. 
Liana Uzunova
Expert-consultant, Economics and International Trade
Economic and trade missions abroad are undoubtedly taking 
significant part in improvement of companies' competitiveness. 
They contribute by establishing contacts with firms abroad, pro-
viding relevant information and consultations, and establishing 
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Other immeasurable in numbers opportunity is municipalities to 
twin with each other. Thus, the personal contacts can develop 
in business. As a result of the twinning process during the last 
months, there were a number of inquiries from the Hungarian 
partners regarding possible partnership in projects within the 
EU Structural Funds. That is a potential which should be used 
in any cases, because for widening our horizons all we need to 
do is to slightly change our perceptions.  
Diana Naydenova
Senior expert, Labour Market Department Confederation of 
Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, Sofia
Workforce is one of the main economic development factors, 
which brings an importance to syndicates' position. We are deeply 
concerned because even if funds and competitive advantages are 
available, they will not lead to good results if there is not enough 
qualified workforce. The previous and the current cabinet's 
anti-crisis measures contribute to a minimal extent to the 
balance on the labour market; to preserve the workforce or to 
open new positions. There are no new jobs opened that deman-
ding high qualification, right on the opposite  more and more of 
them are cut. Bulgarian government is making insufficient efforts 
for preserving the labour resource. The measures taken towards
 cutting the insurance burden will not lead to creation of new 
jobs, because in this way they make social funds thinner needed 
at the same time for unemployment compensation payments. 
These processes may cause such level of poverty, which may 
threat our EU membership. This provokes urgent measures 
concerning the labour market to be taken. 
Some of the labour market problems are the following. We are 
witnessing significant personnel cutting within the big, medium 
and small enterprises. Serious challenges in front of the labour 
market are yet to be faced. The processes within “Kremikovtzi” 
will continue to develop in 2010-2011, which will lead to a num-
ber of negatives for the ports, the Bulgarian National Railways 
and after all for the SMEs, which will be forced to cut their mo-
dest remaining personnel. 
tive trade balance, once could observe an increase in the Hun-
garian investments in Bulgaria as well as a higher number of 
Hungarian tourists. Only for the first eight months of 2009 the 
latter raised by 40 % which is also that is due to the work of the 
Bulgarian trade mission in Hungary. In the same period over 30 
presentations of Bulgarian companies were made which partially 
compensated the shortage of funds for participation in fairs and 
exhibitions. All these facts do not suggest any need of closing 
down the Bulgarian trade mission in Budapest, Hungary but 
unfortunately that is exactly what happened recently.  
Amongst the most important trade missions' partners are the 
embassies and the invest agencies. For example, the Hungarian 
invest agency is supporting for decades their national companies 
to participate in the International Fair held in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. 
Hungary was a partner-country in the critical 2009 with more 
than 60 companies; approximately 25 to 30 of them repeated 
their participation from previous years. This leads to the con-
clusion that participation in such initiatives is worthy and gives 
positive results. Unfortunately, although the Tourist Fair “Tra-
veling” in Budapest influenced very positively the tourist flows 
in both directions, it remained the only one supported by the 
Bulgarian State Agency for Tourism.
The existence of bilateral chambers of commerce is extremely 
important in countries where trade missions are either closing 
or already have been closed down. The chambers are able to 
undertake some of the missions' functions because they are in-
terested in both countries. For example, the newly established
Hungarian-Bulgarian chamber of commerce consists mainly of
Hungarian members which are permanently interested in the
Bulgarian markets. Activities like that could contribute to pre-
serving the bilateral economic and trade relations in future. 
Another option for cooperation is the companies owned by Bul-
garians abroad that are always willing to keep in touch with 
companies and partners from Bulgaria. 
Another concern is the increasing number of permanently unem-
ployed who haven't been working for more than a year and have 
lost work habits and qualification. It is important to pay atten-
tion to these people. But that's not done because it demands 
extra funding, the expenses for which are cut. Instead of the 
planned BGN 165 mln., the cuurent amount is only BGN 65 mln. 
and just BGN 40 mln. out of them are spent for subsided preser-
ving of 38 thousands jobs which is considerably below the num-
ber of closed jobs each month. The measures towards easing 
the risk groups' labour (including up to 29 years-old and above 
50 years-old along with invalids) are also reduced. From BGN 
55 mln. in 2008 the funding in accordance with the National 
Programme “From social payments to employment” was redu-
ced to BGN 15 mln. in 2009. 
All the above mentioned are serious threats and trade unions
are concerned that the population may start social protests, 
if appropriate measures for balancing the labour market are 
not taken soon. We mostly count on the Operational Programmes 
for human resources. Unfortunately, our country is not prepared 
accordingly to adsorb such funding. The main problem remains 
in the administration, which acts both as regulation and 
managing body in the adsorption process. The procedures are 
slow and heavy which is why personnel improvement measures 
must be taken within the institutions themselves. 
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